Oxford and the "Epidemic" of Ordinary Language Philosophy
In the ten years following the end of World War II, Oxford Universi ty was a center of extraordinarily fertile philosophical activity. Out of it arose a new and distinctive philosophical movement, variously known as "ordinary language philosophy," "linguistic analysis," "conceptual analysis," or simply "Oxford philosophy." Although it was centered in Oxford, by the end of the 1950s philosophers based throughout Britain, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and other English-speaking former British colonies were publishing work debating the philosophical concerns of the movement and reflecting its distinctive style of thinking and writing.
By the mid-1960s, however, this way of doing philosophy was already in decline at Oxford, and by the mid-1970s the philosophical climate at Oxford University had become more or less typical of philosophy depart ments elsewhere in the English-speaking world. Ordinary language philos ophy is now a historical movement, rather than an active force in con temporary philosophical discussion.
In many respects, it is useful to think of philosophical movements as intellectual fashions, not unlike changing fashions in architecture or clothing. The question of what accounted for the rise and fall of a partic ular philosophical fashion is of historical and sociological interest, and the methodology developed to answer the question should be of general ap plicability in the study of other intellectual or academic fashions, such as the current dominance of "Theory" in English studies, or the period of "Behaviorism" in theoretical approaches to experimental psychology. So it should be of fairly widespread interest if we can develop a method of accounting for the relatively rapid spread of Oxford philosophy beyond its home base, and for its eventual decline as a force in philosophical thought.
In this paper, then, I shall be pursuing answers to these questions. (1) To what extent was ordinary language philosophy a movement, in the My project resembles that of a medical epidemiologist faced with the task of tracing the spread of a disease throughout a population. The epi demiologist must determine that there is a genuine, single disease to be studied, rather than several distinct diseases with similar symptoms. It is also important to identify the locale where the disease first appeared, to trace the direction in which, and the rate at which, the disease has spread, and if possible to discover why it has spread in this direction and at this rate. Finally, if the disease has lost its momentum and is in retreat, the epi demiologist seeks out the factors accounting for the reversal of fortunes.
Oxford philosophy was indeed considered by many established (and establishment) philosophers to be a kind of disease of philosophy: a par ticularly noxious strain of the analytical philosophy malaise, infecting philosophy departments and the pages of journals with trivial and arid scholarship, just as the "deconstruction" movement was viewed in the 1980s by most members of the English-speaking philosophical establish ment as a malignant infection seeping westward from the intellectual sewers of Paris.
Characteristically, when philosophers inquire into the history of their subject, they concentrate almost exclusively on the written works of the philosophers under investigation. This is of course as it should be, when one is engaged in critical history of philosophy: when one is engaged, that is, in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of a philosopher's arguments or general philosophical approach. In this sort of inquiry, history of phi losophy is almost ahistorical: one is examining philosophical work no longer current (hence it is history); but one is examining the philosophi cal work on its merits as philosophy. But even when historians of philosophy pursue questions of influence, they typically confine themselves to the ex amination of the philosophical texts themselves. A philosopher might actually admit having been influenced by reading another philosopher, as Kant admitted to being shaken from his dogmatic slumbers by reading Hume; or evidence might be found in the writings of philosopher A that he had read and been affected in his own thought by philosopher B. But historians of philosophy seldom seem to ask why philosopher A would have read philosopher in the first place. Questions of this sort are perhaps very difficult to answer in the case of philosophers (and movements) before the era of professionalization in philosophy. But throughout the twentieth century and for much of the nineteenth, the philosophers who have counted, who have been studied in universities and written about by their contemporaries, have mainly been university teachers. Because this is so, the study of the rise and fall of philosophical movements during this period necessarily becomes in part the study of university philosophy de partments: their teaching staff and students. In particular, it becomes the investigation of the institutional and inter-institutional factors that facili tate the transmission of a philosophical fashion throughout an academic population. I will be pursuing this avenue of investigation in what follows. But first it is important to set the scene.
The British Philosophical Establishment on the eve of World War II.
In 1939, Cambridge University was the home of the most distin guished contingent of philosophers in Great Britain. It had been the birthplace of analytic philosophy, at least in the English language, with the ground-breaking work of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore in the first decade of the century. Wittgenstein's association with Russell in Cambridge in the years leading up to World War I provided the impetus for his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. During the early years of the century, and up through the 1930s, the new analytic style of philosophy gradually gained ascendancy in Cambridge and influenced philosophical thought in Britain, the United States and Australia, and also notably in the German-speaking universities of central Europe (e.g., the Vienna Circle).
Neo-Hegelian idealism had flourished at both Cambridge and Oxford at the turn of the century, and Oxford was then also the home of a group of Aristotelian realists influenced by John Cook Wilson, but by the end of the 1930s idealism was a spent force in Britain, and Cook Wilsonian realism had never made much of a mark outside Oxford. Humaniores (popularly known as "Greats") was one of the largest in the university. A program of two years of Greek and Latin language, followed by two further years of either classical literature and history or philoso phy, "Greats" was the favored undergraduate preparation for a career in the British or Imperial civil service.
In 1920, the Honour School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics (popularly known as "PPE") was instituted, for students lacking a back ground in classical languages. This also proved to be a popular subject.
differed from one another in many ways, but were generally identified as ordinary language philosophers by others if not by themselves. 3 Ryle, Austin, Berlin, Weldon, Hampshire, and Grice had been members of the philosophical community of Oxford before the war. The others were appointed in the five years between 1946 and 1950. Many of these were recent graduates. Oxford had a long tradition of making new teaching ap pointments almost exclusively from among its own graduates, and in those days a good first-class Oxford B.A. was considered to be a satisfac tory formal qualification for appointment.
Not every Oxford-trained philosopher of the period invariably wrote or taught in a way that reflected a single point of view or philosophical approach, of course. But enough of them did to give rise to the view, quite widespread at the time, that there was a distinctive "Oxford' way of doing philosophy, and that anyone trained at Oxford would be likely to bear the mark of that philosophical style in his or her teaching and writing.
Philosophers as a rule do not enjoy being identified as members of a herd, and the Oxford linguistic philosophers were no exception. They were given to denying that there was any shared doctrine, or method, and that their mutual disagreements were more important than their similari ties. It is true that there was never anything amounting to a doctrinal or methodological manifesto of the sort that the members of the Vienna Circle famously produced. And there were indeed significant philosophi cal differences among them, but as Iris Murdoch once remarked: "Our current philosophers look very different only if, so to speak, one is standing close to them; from further away the family resemblance, at the very least, would look very clear."4 Prominent among the family resemblances was a shared conviction that ordinary, non-technical language of "the plain man" is an invaluable philosophical resource. Not only was it thought that inattention to the ordinary use of words had been a chief source of error and confusion in philosophy; a close scrutiny of the details of ordinary speech was thought to be the primary source of illumination about the concepts germane to prominent areas of philosophical debate, such as the mind-body problem, knowledge, or free will. This attitude toward ordinary language was most memorably articulated by Austin:
So much, then, for ways in which the study of excuses may throw light on ethics. But there are also reasons why it is an attractive subject methodolog ically, at least if we are to proceed 'from ordinary language', that is, by examining what we should say when, and so why and what we should mean by it. Perhaps this method, at least as one philosophical method, scarcely requires justification at present?too evidently there is gold in them thar hills: ... First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the con nexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon?the most favoured al ternative method. . . . certainly ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved on and super seded. Only remember, it is the first word.5
According to G. J. Warnock, Austin, Ryle, and philosophers close to them also closely resembled one another in their philosophical antipathies.
There was a prevailing idea that most of the difficulty, of the unsatisfactori ness and disorder, of philosophy was attributable to obscurity, unclearness, and (consequently) confusion. (Some would have attributed to those defects the very existence of the subject itself.) Thus above all things obscurity was to be avoided; and from that certain more specific avoidances followed. First, literary pretension, rhetoric, the 'high style' of the Idealists, or the deep mystery-mongering of (for example) Heidegger; a philosopher's first duty, prior even to that of being right and immeasurably prior to that of being eloquent, was to be clearly, plainly, and readily understood. Second, over ambition and haste, biting off more than could be conclusively and thoroughly chewed, undertaking to settle too many questions too quickly? rather, small points clearly stated, limited aims clearly set out. Related to that was a certain distrust of 'theories', which were apt to be regarded?particu larly by Austin?as both over-ambitious (because, in the current rudimentary state of the subject, premature) and potentially distorting, inhibiting clear and accurate perception of the actual phenomena under consideration. And for partly the same reason?and again most markedly in Austin?there was much suspicion of technical terminology, of 'formalization'. 6 By the late 1940s philosophy at Oxford had become permeated by the spirit of the new "ordinary language" approach. This Zeitgeist was recently recalled by Francis Sparshott, who was an undergraduate of the period.
I recall sitting at a table in a caf? with some fellow students one morning. We were talking about philosophy in general terms, and I was struck by the fact that those present not only assumed that the "ordinary language" mode had superseded all other ways of doing philosophy, but agreed that the task of philosophy would soon be finished. . . . there was a wonderful feeling of euphoria in the air, something for which I feel a deep nostalgia. 'Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be young was very heaven!1 It was a really wonderful feeling that something new and very important was happening here and now in philosophy, and in a way in which one could share.7
There are many points of resemblance between the Oxford ordinary language philosophy of the postwar period and the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, resemblances that, as Murdoch remarked, become more no ticeable the further back one stands. Wittgenstein's followers F. Waismann, G. A. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe were all teaching in Oxford during these years and working in a philosophical idiom rather similar in many respects to the Oxford ordinary language philosophers. This contributed to the impression that the Oxford philosophers and the Wittgensteinians formed a united front. But there were also significant dif ferences. Wittgenstein in his later period thought that philosophical perplexity is a form of obsession arising out of confusion over the way words are actually used. Revealing the actual uses of words in the "language games" in which they play their roles will lead to the dissolu tion of the perplexity, and as a result the urge to philosophize, to construct philosophical theories, will dissipate. Austin, Ryle and the other Oxford philosophers, on the other hand, though they agreed that philosophical theories generally are generated prematurely and are based on inattention to the relevant linguistic facts, did believe that general philosophical con clusions were possible, and that the main positive task of philosophy is, in Ryle's words, to "map the logical geography" of our common stock of concepts. However, philosophers who were not themselves close to the work of these two groups tended to lump them together when they spoke of "ordinary language" philosophy. This becomes all the more under standable in view of the fact that the "center of gravity" of the ordinary language movement certainly moved from Cambridge to Oxford The Concept of Mind was the first large-scale deployment of the ordinary language techniques. It made Ryle probably the most famous Oxford philosopher during the post-war years. Austin, however, had been the driving force behind a distinctively Oxford brand of analytic philoso phy. But his influence was exerted not so much through his published works, which were few, but through the force of his personality and his skills as a devastating critic of the views of others. He influenced his
Oxford colleagues principally through a weekly "class" he conducted every Saturday morning. Attendance was by invitation only, and only those among the Oxford dons junior to Austin were eligible for invitation. It was in these meetings that Austin attempted to carry out his ambition to turn the conduct of philosophical enquiry into a cooperative undertaking, and it was here also that the focus of attention was frequently the examination of nuances of ordinary language pursued for its own sake, and not in the service of some larger, more recognizably philosophical aim.13 Austin's own philosophical approach had developed during the later 1930s. His first published paper, "Are There A Priori Concepts?" (1939)14 shows many of the characteristic features of his own distinctive post-war philo sophical approach, but there is no trace there of Wittgenstein's influence.
The impact of ordinary language philosophy at Oxford.
With so many like-minded philosophers all teaching in the same uni versity, many of them meeting regularly with one another to discuss philosophy, was there any noticeable effect on the way philosophy was taught in the university during the post-war period? Examination questions provide perhaps the best source of concrete evidence about changes in the philosophy curriculum at Oxford, since all candidates for degrees in "Greats" in a given year are exposed to a common set of essay questions, and those in "PPE" are exposed to a different set. Candidates always have some choice; they must choose four or so questions on each examination paper from a list of about a dozen. But if questions suddenly appear on a topic not covered in examinations of earlier years, or questions crop up which appear to invite a particular line of discussion, it can signal a change in philosophical preoccupation on the part of the examiners, espe cially if questions of a very similar sort appear in subsequent years.
Those candidates in "Greats" who select philosophy as a special subject write an examination in Logic and one in Moral and Political Phi losophy, as do those in "PPE." Both subjects are very broadly construed.
"Logic" is understood to cover not so much formal inference as philo sophical logic and also questions in metaphysics and epistemology, whereas "Moral and Political Philosophy" includes as well questions con cerning human action and thought. The 1946 examinations in these subjects in both "Greats" and "PPE" are practically indistinguishable in general philosophical orientation from those in the immediate pre-war years.15 However, questions reflecting the special interests of the Oxford ordinary language philosophers began to appear on both papers of the "Greats" examination as early as 1947.16 They occur with increasing frequency throughout the 1950s, with the 1957 Logic paper on the "PPE" examination containing no less than eleven of fourteen questions inviting an ordinary language approach. At no time during the period were the question papers so dominated by the concerns of linguistic philosophers that students would be unable to make a good showing if they were not prepared to adopt the "party line." However, enough questions that did invite such a response were included so that those who wanted to show off their "ordinary language" credentials had ample opportunity to shine.
Questions of this sort continued to be a familiar feature of both sets of ex aminations into the mid-1960s, when they begin to taper off sharply, and questions began to appear which invited a critique of some of the "signature" features of the ordinary language approach.
In the early post-war years Oxford also instituted a new graduate degree in philosophy, which was to prove very successful in attracting students aiming toward a professional career in philosophy. Between the wars, Oxford offered the post-graduate degree of Doctor of Philosophy (D.Phil.). This was an exclusively research degree, in which the student worked on a rather narrowly defined topic, nearly always historical in nature, under a single supervisor. It was Gilbert Ryle who, more than anyone else, realized that there would be a growing demand for philoso phy teachers, and who lobbied strongly and effectively for the institution of the new graduate degree, involving a series of examinations and the preparation of a short thesis. This degree, the Bachelor of Philosophy, was designed specifically to prepare its graduates for teaching careers in phi losophy. Among the B.Phil, examination papers in the early years, the ordinary language philosophy approach was also much in evidence among the questions, from the first examination in 1948 through the early 1960s.17 During the twenty years from 1945 to 1965, Oxford continued its tradition of appointing mainly its own recent graduates to junior faculty positions in philosophy. Increasingly after 1950, these included B.Phil, graduates. It should be noted that the successful candidates for these positions were those who had done very well on either the B.A. or B.Phil, exami nations, and quite a few of these were young ordinary language philosophers.
Oxford philosophers in the job market.
Although the university was faced in the early post-war period with the need to make a large number of philosophy teaching appointments in a very short period, it was fortunate to have an extraordinary pool of local talent form which to choose. But there were considerably more capable young Oxford graduates seeking academic appointments than there were openings at Oxford. They were fortunate that most other British universi ties also needed to make a significant number of philosophy appointments.
Oxford had been the largest single supplier of teachers in the rela tively small British university system before the war, but posts had been relatively few in number and vacancies relatively infrequent. Many young philosophers were unable to find a position in Britain or even abroad, and had to look elsewhere for employment: typically in the civil service, school teaching, or in earlier days, the Church. That changed dramatically as a consequence of the post-war bulge in university enrolment, created at first by returning veterans of the war, but sustained throughout the fifties as the participation rate gradually increased.18 By the early 1960s, the "baby boom" generation was reaching university age, leading to another enrolment bulge.
Because of the large numbers of its graduates entering the job market throughout all these years, Oxford was much better placed than any other U.K. university?indeed much better placed than any university in the English-speaking world?to supply the burgeoning demand. Was there an ordinary language philosophy epidemic?
As we have seen, the story of the growth of the philosophy profes sion in Great Britain in the two decades after 1945 is to a significant extent the story of the success of Oxford-trained philosophers in the job market. Since this was also the period during which ordinary language philosophy began to dominate philosophical discussion at Oxford, one might expect that this distinctive philosophical style would make a similarly strong impact throughout the British universities.
If Oxford was indeed exporting a philosophical movement as well as philosophers, one would expect evidence to show up in the publications of the B.Phil, graduates who had taken teaching posts outside Oxford.
Success in a university teaching career was increasingly coming to depend on publications, so one would expect that these graduates would as a group be active publishers, and that the philosophy being published by them would reflect their philosophical orientation. The first B.Phil, degrees were awarded in 1948.19 (See Table 1 However, the total number of ordinary language philosophers in Britain outside Oxford University during this fifteen year period probably never amounted to more than twenty percent of the total number of philosophers in the country. One might conclude from these figures that Oxford lin guistic philosophy had only a very modest impact on the B.Phil. students who were studying in Oxford during the heyday of the movement, and exerted through them a similarly modest influence on the conduct of philosophical inquiry throughout Britain during this period. If, however, one found between ten and twenty percent of a popula tion infected by some disease, such as influenza, one would conclude that one had an epidemic on one's hands. Although only 39 of the 68 B.Phil, graduates in British universities outside Oxford in 1965 ever appear to have been practitioners of Oxford linguistic philosophy, and these were to be found in only twenty universities, that meant that fully two-thirds of the universities in Britain in 1965 had on staff at least one representative of the movement. If two-thirds of the schools in one's community harboured carriers of a disease, one might well be alarmed.
Ordinary language philosophy was also carried to Australia by There is more than a grain of truth to Ayer's claim that ordinary language philosophy "virtually died" with Austin, even though Austin's own philosophy generated a considerable amount of interest and critical attention in the wider philosophical community in the 1960s, as three volumes of posthumous publications came out in rapid succession.27
Several factors, I think, contributed to the decline of ordinary language philosophy at Oxford University after Austin's death, in addition to the loss of Austin's leadership. First, Ayer's return definitely made a differ ence, as a rallying point for those philosophers at Oxford who had not been in sympathy with the Austinian way of doing things and resented the influence he had exercised on the philosophical temperament of the place.
Among those who had disapproved of Austin's influence at Oxford was Michael Dummett, who looked to Frege for philosophical inspiration, and who was much more interested in the developments in the more formal, systematic analytic philosophy then being produced in the United States than he ever was in the concerns of the Oxford linguistic philoso phers. Dummett began publishing the work for which he has become justly famous in the early 1960s, and began to attract a following from among the undergraduates and graduate students in residence at Oxford. A more synoptic, systematic philosophical approach was also Graduates. Twenty-five of these had been appointed since 1970, but only four of them showed the influence of ordinary language philosophy in their published work.
The decline of ordinary language philosophy in Australia during the later 1960s is even more dramatic. Australians continued to come to Oxford to study during the 1960s, but increasing numbers of Australians were also now travelling for this purpose to American and Canadian uni versities. Seven post-1965 B.Phil, graduates were among the 122 philosophers in Australia's universities in 1970, and another five were appointed in the following five years. Only two of the twelve, however, ever appear to have been practitioners of ordinary language philosophy.
After about 1975, then, ordinary language philosophy had more or less ceased to exist as a vital philosophical movement. Oxford University remains today an important supplier of philosophers to the academy; however, it has never regained the dominant position it held in the third quarter of the last century. It is highly unlikely that any single university will ever again command such a large "market share." Conclusion.
I have been tracing the distribution of Oxford-trained philosophers throughout Great Britain and Australia in the years following the end of World War II, a period in which Oxford was able to supply from its own B.A. and B.Phil, graduates a significant proportion of the large demand for philosophy teachers to respond to the demographic bulge of students of the immediate post-war era in Britain.
The spread of ordinary language philosophy was at least in part a byproduct of the fact that a vigorous and novel philosophical approach emerged at Oxford University at precisely the period in which there was a burgeoning demand for philosophy teachers, which Oxford was uniquely situated to satisfy. The fact that a significant number of able ordinary language philosophers secured positions at Oxford University itself in the early post-war years ensured that a "critical mass" of like-minded thinkers were able to sustain a philosophical conversation locally for many years. This, as we have seen, had an effect on the way philosophy was taught in the university, as reflected in the growing prominence of "linguistic phi losophy" questions on the examination papers. Students who are encouraged to read and think about philosophy in a certain way, and are good at doing so and enjoy it, tend to carry on that philosophical approach in their own teaching and writing, at least in their early professional years. We have seen how Oxford-trained philosophers dominated the job market in Britain during the years of expansion in the number of philosophy posts;
and we have seen that enough of them published papers and books ex hibiting the family characteristics of ordinary language philosophy to feed the widespread impression that ordinary language philosophy was a fast spreading contagion, threatening to overrun the British academy and to pose a genuine menace to philosophy throughout the English-speaking world.
Austin's death, and the loss of momentum of ordinary language phi losophy in Oxford; the diaspora of prominent Oxford ordinary language philosophers; the growing competition in the job market of other philoso phy graduate programs; the general shrinking of the job market in philosophy beginning in the 1970s; all these conspired to reduce dramat ically the number of ordinary language philosophers from Oxford taking up posts in philosophy in Oxford, Britain and Australia after about 1965. The posthumous publication of Austin's major writings in the early 1960s spurred a flurry of interest in his views, but few new works exhibiting that approach were now being published. Oxford became just another all purpose, generally analytic philosophy department, and the ordinary language philosophy movement drifted into history.
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